Abstract-In many countries, the Internet is under stringent censorship for political or religious reasons which severely undermines the free flow of information. A censorship-resistant web browsing system must be scalable, blocking resistant, and tracing resistant. However, current censorship-resistant web browsing systems, which use a group of dedicated proxies to bypass censorship, fail to meet these requirements. To tackle these challenges, we propose Freeweb, which relies on widely-distributed peer-to-peer (P2P) nodes in a decentralized manner rather than specified proxies in a centralized manner. We also proposed enhancement methods to reduce file access delay and avoid node overloads in Freeweb. Freeweb is built on top of a Distributed Hash Table ( DHT)-based P2P network, where nodes not under censorship help nodes under censorship to access blocked webpages. Freeweb has a web browser front-end whose user interface resembles existing web browsers. The underlying complex process of retrieving blocked webpages is therefore hidden from users. We implemented an open-sourced Freeweb and conducted extensive real-world experiments on PlanetLab. The experimental results show that Freeweb has a high success rate and reasonable browsing latency, and its enhancement reduces much network load and file access latency, and avoids node overloads.
Problem Statement and Challenges
We aim to build a system that allows users who are under Internet censorship to access blocked websites. Such a system must satisfy the following three requirements. First, the system must be blocking resistant, which means that it is very difficult for censors to block the web browsing service provided by this system. This requirement is critical because it ensures the long-term viability of such a service. Second, the system must be tracing resistant, which means that it is very difficult to trace end users who request to access blocked webpages. This requirement is critical to ensure the safety of the users of this system because the governments practicing internet censorship may punish citizens who violate such censorship with imprisonment or other sanctions. Third, this system must be scalable, which means that the system must scale to a large number of users with no significant performance degradation.
Current censorship-resistant web browsing systems fail to meet these three requirements simultaneously. The systems [14] , [15] , [22] , [29] , [32] , [50] use a group of dedicated proxies to access webpages for censored nodes in order to bypass censorship. However, any solution based upon a limited number of permanent proxies cannot provide strong blocking resistant and tracing resistant service because these fixed proxies can detected and blocked by censors without much difficulty [53] . The number of users of TOR decreases after the blocking of 80 percent of its proxies in 2009 [34] . After a censor detects proxies, it can compromise the proxies and launch inside attacks [53] to find the censored nodes that generate content requesters. Also, the centralized approach, in which a limited number of proxies serve a large number of censored nodes, prevents the systems from achieving high scalability. Building a censorship resistant web browsing system that can meet these three requirements has become a formidable challenge.
Our Approach
To deal with the challenge, we propose Freeweb, the first peer-to-peer (P2P) approach to censorship-resistant web browsing. The basic idea of Freeweb is to allow the P2P nodes in uncensored regions serve as the proxies of the P2P nodes in censored regions for accessing blocked websites. Specifically, the URL of a webpage will be used as the search key in the Distributed Hash Table ( DHT)-based P2P network. The user interface of this system is a Firefox-or Internet Explorer-like web browser. After a user types in a URL in the address bar of this special browser, the URL, as a search key, traverses the P2P network and finally reaches a node that can access the URL. This destination node will act as a proxy for this URL request: obtaining the page and sending the page back to the URL requester through a tunnel. In this work, we design and implement Freeweb based on a DHT structured P2P network [51] . Freeweb can easily adapt to unstructured P2P networks. In an unstructured P2P network, instead of using the URL as the search key, Freeweb uses flooding or random walk to send the request to all or partial neighbors until it is forwarded to a node in an uncensored area. The reason that Freeweb uses the DHT-based mechanism is because it is more scalable than flooding and random walk in file searching. Besides, based on a structured DHT, Freeweb can easily build a proximity-aware structure to enhance its file fetch efficiency by finding a peer under an uncensored area with a bounded number of hops.
Freeweb meets the above three requirements. First, Freeweb achieves blocking resistance because every node in an uncensored region may serve as a proxy for some URLs at some time in this P2P network, and blocking all such nodes is practically infeasible. Attempts to block the distribution of the Freeweb software can be defeated by distributing Freeweb in existing P2P networks and dynamically changing bootstrapping nodes. Second, Freeweb achieves tracing resistance because Freeweb encrypts URL requests and does not distinguish request initiators and request forwarders. Tracing the request initiators is therefore impractical. Third, Freeweb achieves high scalability because the massive number of nodes from uncensored regions and its decentralized manner allow Freeweb to scale to a large number of users. We argue that P2P is the right approach to enable free web browsing in censored areas. To browse blocked sites, proxies are inevitably needed. The number of proxies has to be massive; otherwise, they can be identified and blocked by censors, and fail to support a scalable system. Furthermore, the massive number of proxies have to be self-organized because any central management server can be identified and blocked by censors. Thus far, P2P is the leading technology to achieve such a massive self-organized network.
Key Contribution
First, we propose a censorship-resistant web browsing system that achieves the goals of blocking resistance, tracing resistance, efficient transmission, and high scalability. Second, we implemented Freeweb and open-sourced Freeweb at http://freewebcu.sourceforge.net/. Then, we introduce a proximity-aware efficiency enhancement to further reduce overhead of network load and fetch time. We further conducted extensive experiments on PlanetLab [9] . The experimental results show that Freeweb has a high success rate and reasonable browsing latency. Also, the enhancement methods are effective in further reducing file fetch time, network load, and avoiding the node overload of Freeweb. Note that Freeweb is developed only for people who urgently need the access of text and objects in webpages. It does not support multimedia transmission, which leaves as our future work.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. We first examine prior work in Section 2. In Section 3, we present the design and implementation of Freeweb. In Section 4, we present enhanced methods for Freeweb. Then, we present experimental results in Section 5 and give concluding remarks in Section 6. We also discuss a number of issues in the basic design of Freeweb and analyze its reliability in Section 7 in the appendix, which can be found on the Computer Society Digital Library at http://doi.ieeecomputersociety. org/10.1109/TPDS.2015.2468227.
RELATED WORK
Prior censorship-resistant web browsing systems all use a group of dedicated proxies to bypass censorship. Web MIXes (JAP) [14] is based on MIXes [15] , which provides anonymity by relay forwarding. In JAP, a node waits until it has received a certain number of messages, and then mixes them up before forwarding them. In this way, it hides the sender and the receiver from an eavesdropper on network traffic. K€ opsell and Hillig proposed an add-on [32] to enable volunteers to act as forwarders in the MIXes by letting them register in the centralized information server, but it still requires a set of proxy servers. Infranet [22] uses commercial websites as proxies. In Infranet, a user encodes a series of normal HTTP requests into a covert request and sends it to a responder. The responder retrieves the required content from the web server and uses steganography to encode forbidden content into harmless images, thus ensuring the deniability of users. Kaleidoscope [50] limits every user's knowledge to a small and consistent proportion of all the proxies; however, due to the limited number of proxies, all proxies can still be detected after a number of tries. Proxify [10] does not require users to install software; although convenient, it can be easily defeated through URL filtering. Psiphon [29] allows volunteer users to register their computers as proxies, which can dynamically increase the number of proxies; however, Psiphon still relies on a central server that can be easily blocked. Furthermore, because a proxy directly connects with both a blocked site and a URL requester, a censor may "volunteer" their computers as proxies. Thus, Psiphon is not tracing resistant.
Prior censorship resistant web browsing systems all have difficulty achieving blocking resistance, tracing resistance, and scalability due to the use of a small number of fixed proxies that can be easily blocked by censors. Psiphon [29] tries to increase the number of proxies, but it cannot prevent its central server from being blocked. Infranet [22] tries to provide tracing resistance by steganography, but censors can easily hunt users down by monitoring accesses to the small number of fixed proxies. Herrmann et al. [27] found that current distributed web search engines based on P2P networks cannot provide censorship resistance and privacy protection with modest resources. Therefore, they proposed the node density protocol to detect censorship attacks and the webpage verification protocol to detect malicious nodes. Tor [20] , I2P [7] , Tarzon [23] , 4P [56] and Octopus [52] provide anonymity services using proxies and (or) P2P networks. Tor has 6,000 proxies [11] and their IP addresses can be easily retrieved [53] . For a request, its random path is selected by the requester and the last hop is always a proxy that communicates with the destination directly. Therefore, censors can block all the proxies to stop its service. Also, Tor limits the distribution of proxies' IP addresses [53] . Freeweb differs from Tor in that each peer provides service functions equally in Freeweb. Thus, it is difficult to block millions of peers at the same time in the system.
OneSwarm [28] provides file sharing users privacy by enabling users have configurable control over the amount of trust they place in peers and in the sharing model for their data. Unlike these works, Freeweb mainly focuses on censorship circumvention though it also offers anonymity.
Many systems [35] , [36] , [37] , [38] , [39] have been proposed that leverage P2P networks to improve system performance such as efficiency and scalability. Different from these works, Freeweb uses a P2P network for scalable, unblocking and untraceable censorship-resistant web browsing. Freeweb also shares the similarity with proximity-aware searching in P2P file systems in order to improve the searching efficiency. The works in [17] and [19] measured the inter-ISP traffic in BitTorrent and indicated the importance of localityawareness traffic in reducing the traffic over long-distance connections. Genaud and Rattanapoka [24] proposed a P2P-based middleware, called P2P-MPI, for proximity-aware resource discovery. P2P-MPI has co-allocation strategies that try to maintain and maximize locality between processes. Liu et al. [40] took PPLive as an example and examined traffic locality in Internet P2P streaming systems. Without using any topology information or demanding any infrastructure support, the study revealed that PPLive achieves high Internet service providers (ISP) level traffic locality. Shen and Hwang [46] proposed a locality-aware architecture with resource clustering and discovery algorithms for efficient and robust resource discovery in wide-area distributed grid systems. Yang and Yang [55] combined the structured and unstructured overlay with proximity-awareness for P2P networks; and the central-core structured overlay with supernodes ensures the availability of searching results. Gross et al. [25] proposed a BitTorrent-like downloading scheme with locality-aware file searching and replication in order to supply a robust and fast downloading. Manzillo et al. [41] proposed the collaborative locality-aware overlay service, which reduces the transmit cost of ISPs by switching to the source inside the same ISP with the requester. A number of other works with proximity-awareness also take into account the physical structure of the underlying network [16] , [31] , [57] . Instead of facilitating the file searching in P2P, Freeweb clusters nodes with proximity-awareness to improve the URL searching efficiency and congestion control. Also, with the proximity-awareness, Freeweb is enhanced to be ISPfriendly [18] by resolving requests locally first, which helps reduce a large amount of costly inter-ISP traffic.
FREEWEB DESIGN AND IMPLEMENTATION

Assumptions and Threat Model
We envision Freeweb as consisting of a massive number (tens of thousands to millions as in a P2P network) of joined nodes. The nodes are censored in some areas while uncensored in other areas. In Freeweb, nodes in an uncensored area help nodes in a censored area to retrieve blocked webpages. In this process, we refer to the uncensored node as the server and the censored node as the client. Some uncensored nodes all over the world may volunteer to help censored nodes to access blocked websites. This is true because in uncensored regions (such as North America), people usually have extra computing and networking resources to share [12] and they are willing to help others for a good cause. Also, we can provide incentives, such as virtual credits, to encourage nodes to provide the service. The virtual credits can be used to buy magazines, games, and movies. The servers earn virtual credits from clients, and nodes can buy virtual credits using real money.
Since providing protection against a strong censor is not feasible in designing a low-latency system [20] , we assume the censor is capable of controlling only a fraction of all traffic and nodes in the network. Traffic control includes analyzing, intercepting, generating and deleting traffic. Node control includes deploying a number of censor operated nodes in Freeweb and/or compromising a fraction of all nodes in the network. These assumptions hold in reality because, after all, censors have limited resources.
The censor's expected actions mainly include (1) Identifying the initiator of a communication (client), since the law where the censor is located may view such clients as illegal. Even with encrypted data packets, the censor can still find out clients by identifying traffic patterns. We aim to protect clients from a traffic analysis attack. (2) Identifying the nodes that provide service. Since such nodes are usually located outside the censor's traffic control range, the censor can only determine their existence by analyzing the intercepted packets and blocking the traffic containing their IPs. (3) Passive traffic analysis and active traffic controlling. Censors can mimic/hijack typical service requesters to send out massive requests to the network or act like functional service providers to collect overhead traffic. They can analyze or correlate the traffic to identify abnormality. Moreover, censors can mimic nodes or cooperate with compromised nodes in generating false information, traffic redirecting, or even running Sybil [21] or Eclipse [49] attacks. Fig. 1 shows a high-level overview of the workflow in Freeweb. The client and server pair is nodes in the DHT network. Firstly, the client sends out its request, including a URL, an onion path, and a symmetric key K s , with the URL's hashed value as the destination (Step 1). Via DHT routing, the request is forwarded towards its destination (Step 2). Once the request reaches an intermediate node that can serve as the server or its destination that serves as the server, the server node stores the request into its Request Pool. From the pool, the server fetches the URL request and then fetches the webpage specified by the URL (Step 3). After a webpage is retrieved (Step 4), the server compresses the webpage into one file, encrypts the compressed file using the K s in the request (Step 5), and sends the file back along the onion path (Steps 6&7). Finally, the client decrypts and decompresses the received file, and displays the webpage in the Freeweb web browser (Step 8).
Overview of Freeweb
In the following, we first briefly describe DHT networks and then present the details of the design and implementation of Freeweb in terms of two aspects: request forwarding and reply forwarding.
Introduction of DHT Networks
DHTs are a class of decentralized systems in the application level that partition ownership of a set of objects among participating nodes and efficiently route messages to the unique owner of any given object. In a DHT network, peers function as clients as well as servers, and each peer is represented by a node ID for node indexing. A DHT provides two main functions: Insert(key,object), to store an object in its owner node, and Lookup(key), to retrieve the object by the DHT routing algorithm. Each object has a key that is the consistent hash [30] value of the object's name; similarly, each node has a key that is the consistent hash value of the node's IP address. Each node maintains a routing table of log N size to store its neighbors in the network, where N is the number of nodes in the system. A DHT provides Oðlog NÞ lookup time complexity. DHTs excel in scalability and reliability. To maintain topology in node dynamism, including node joins, departures, and failures, DHTs use stabilization and selforganizing mechanisms. Specifically, each node periodically updates its successor, predecessor, and its neighbors in its routing table. Freeweb is built based on the Chord DHT [51] , though it can use any other DHTs. Please refer to [51] for the details of the DHT networks.
Design Details of Freeweb
In Freeweb, each node generates a public key K pub and a private key K pri upon joining. It exchanges its public key, IP address, and port number with its neighbors in its routing table. The DHT routing table of a node in Freeweb has one additional column for storing the public key of each neighbor of the node. During the periodical DHT stabilization [51] that updates routing tables, each node exchanges the public key with its new neighbors in the table. Thus, in DHT routing in Freeweb, a request is always forwarded from a node to its neighbor in its routing table whose public key is known to the node. Public key cryptography is much more computing expensive than symmetric key cryptography. For further optimization, a node can use the public keys to establish a symmetric key with each neighbor. This symmetric key can be periodically refreshed for better security.
Request Forwarding
Because a webpage can be uniquely identified by its URL, we use a URL as the search key for a webpage. Fig. 2 illustrates the process of a requester finding a service provider. When a censored node c wants to access a URL u, c first applies the consistent hash function h used by the DHT to URL u; it then sends its request r using hðuÞ as the search key (i.e., destination key) in the DHT by Insert(key, object), where object is r encrypted by the periodically established symmetric key between current hop and the next hop. The next hop decrypts r using the same symmetric key, then encrypts r using the symmetric key between it and its next hop before forwarding the message to its next hop. The request will finally arrive at the node that is the owner of hðuÞ, denoted s 1 . If s 1 is uncensored, s 1 retrieves the webpage as a file, compresses the file, and sends it back to c along an onion routing path specified by c in its request; if s 1 cannot access URL u, s 1 uses h 2 ðuÞ ¼ ðhðhðuÞÞÞ as the new search key for this request and forwards the request to the owner node s 2 of h 2 ðuÞ. This process repeats v times until the owner node of h v ðuÞ is able to access URL u; then, this node serves client c by accessing u for c. Thus, in Freeweb, the owner node of h v ðuÞ always acts as the server of the URL u. The deterministic routing provided by the DHT lookup function ensures that nodes find the webpage server. The server node caches its retrieved webpage in order to serve the subsequent requests within a certain time window without fetching the webpage again. We call the above request forwarding scheme a deterministic scheme. Always relying on one server to access a webpage may overload the server and make it traceable. Thus, we extend the deterministic scheme to an opportunistic scheme by complementing it with an additional algorithm. Recall that a message needs to travel a number of hops before arriving at its destination. While traveling, the message may arrive at an uncensored node that can access u. At this time, the travel terminates, and this intermediate node acts as the server for the request to access u from node c.
Next, we introduce the way in which a node generates its request. When a client c initiates a request r, c needs to specify the reply path for the server s to send the retrieved webpage back. To form a reply path, client c can use the nodes in its routing table. Suppose that the specified reply path is a ! b ! c. Thus, the full reply path is s ! a ! b ! c. To preserve c's anonymity, server s should only know that it needs to send the reply to a, but does not know the rest of the path. Similarly, node a should only know that it needs to send the reply to b and node b only knows that it needs to send the reply to c. To achieve this goal, we use the technique of onion routing [20] , [45] . After c generates the reply path a ! b ! c, it includes the following onion in the request r:
In the onion, random (e.g., 23abcABC) is a string randomly generated by c. Later on, when c retrieves string "23abcABC" from a reply message, it knows that the string was generated by itself and hence the reply is for itself.
There are two modes in webpage fetching: text-only mode and full-page mode. The requester specifies a fetching mode. In the text-only mode, the server only fetches the plain text of the HTML page specified by the URL. In the full-page mode, the server fetches the rich content of the HTML page specified by the URL including images, etc. We include the text-only mode in Freeweb because many times the reader may be mainly interested in the text content of a webpage, and getting only the text content is faster than getting the full page. Fig. 4 shows the format of the request message. The URL field stores the requested URL. The onion field is a layered onion structure, with each layer containing the IP and port information of one onion routing hop encrypted by the proper public key. The time-to-live (TTL) field indicates the maximum number of hops in a client-server path that a message is forwarded before being discarded for prevention of perpetual looping. Whenever a request is forwarded by a hop, its TTL is decreased by 1, and the requests with TTL ¼ 0 will not be forwarded anymore. The retrieval mode field indicates the webpage retrieval mode: text-only mode or fullpage mode. The timeliness field is used only in the case when a requested webpage is in a node's cache. It is a time period specified by the client to require that the cached period of the webpage does not exceed the specified value. The last file key field is the symmetric key K s generated by c and will be used by the server to encrypt the retrieved webpage.
In the Freeweb implementation, each node provides the service of sending/forwarding a request by SendRequest (URL, onionPath, retrievalMode,TTL, Timeliness). This function provides a customized request interface for a web browsing service. Every parameter corresponds to one field in a request message. The function SendRequest () uses the public key of the next hop to encrypt all the fields then executes the DHT function Insert(key,object), where key is the hashed value of the URL and object is the encrypted message. For example, when request r is passing from node a to its neighbor node B through SendRequest(), node a encrypts r using node b's public key. After node b receives the encrypted request ðrÞ K b pub , node B decrypts it using its private key K b pri . If node B cannot serve the request, it needs to forward the request to node c. Node b then encrypts r using node c's public key and sends ðrÞ K c pub to node c through SendRequest(). Node c repeats the same process.
Reply Forwarding
In each request originating from client c, c specifies the reply path for the server node of this request to send the retrieved webpage back to c. Fig. 3 shows the process of reply forwarding. After server s retrieves the webpage of URL u as a file f, s encrypts f using key K s , which is generated by client c and included in the request. Thus, after receiving ðfÞ Ks , c can obtain the webpage f using key K s . Server s sends the webpage ðfÞ K s along the specified reply path in the request back to c. Recall that the path is encrypted using the onion routing technique. The onion included in the request indicates that server s needs to send ðfÞ Ks to node a with IP address IP a at port Port a . After node a receives ðfÞ K s along with
, node a peels off one layer of the onion by decrypting the onion using its private key. Then, a knows that it needs to forward the message ðfÞ K s to node b with IP address IP b at port Port b . After node b receives ðfÞ Ks along with the onion ðrandomjIP c jPort c Þ K b pub , it peels off one more layer of the onion by decrypting the onion using its private key. Then, b knows that it needs to forward the message ðfÞ Ks to node c with IP address IP c at port Port c . After node c receives ðfÞ K s along with the onion random, it notices that it is the final receiver according to its generated random and then uses key K s to obtain webpage f.
Consequently, server node s and every intermediate node in the reply path only know the next node that they should forward the reply to and do not know the final receiver, i.e., the request originator. In this way, the identity of the request originator is kept confidential. An alternative method of reply forwarding is to let the webpage traverse the reverse path that the request follows; however, this path may be unnecessarily long for a reply path. The number of hops that the request traverses before reaching the server is Oðv log nÞ, where v is the number of times that the owner node is unfortunately under censorship. Because c specifies a reply path, the length of the reply path can be a constant, which is more efficient than using a path of length Oðv log nÞ. In the full-page mode, the server needs to retrieve and compress all items of a webpage before sending the file to the requester. In order to reduce content fetching latency, once the server receives an item, it forwards the item to the requester using the established request forwarding path for the first item. This way, the requester can view the webpage timely and progressively.
Implementation
Freeweb is built upon OpenChord, an open source implementation of the Chord DHT. In the current version of Freeweb, we mainly focus on web browsing functionalities. We have not yet implemented other complex functions such as POST, PUT, and video streaming support. We plan to add these functionalities to Freeweb in the future version. Freeweb provides APIs to store all serializable Java objects in a DHT network. For ease of deployment, we developed two versions of Freeweb: a Windows-based version and a Linux-based version. Freeweb consists of about 5,000 lines of Java code in addition to the OpenChord infrastructure. We have put our source code on the open source repository sourceforge at http://sourceforge.net/projects/freewebcu/.
Freeweb has three additional layers built on top of OpenChord as shown in Fig. 5 . The first layer is DHT Server. It provides customized APIs based on the "raw" APIs of OpenChord for object storage and fetching, as well as operations that deal with node dynamism. The second layer contains two modules: a network daemon and a communication management module. The network daemon module constantly monitors the change of the request pool, taking necessary actions such as forwarding or providing service. The communication management module takes care of TCP-based communication, including public key dissemination and webpage distribution. The third layer provides cryptography primitives, cache management, and APIs for HTTP accesses.
Network Daemon
The Network Daemon periodically scans the Request Pool and serves the stored requests in a first-in-first-out order. Algorithm 1 shows how the Network Daemon works. It cycles to look for new requests and performs web accesses until interrupted by the user. For each request, the IP and port information (code lines 6-7) of the requester is retrieved, and then the fetched webpage is sent to the requester (code line 18). If the requested webpage is in the cache, the corresponding package is fetched from the cache (code lines 10-12). Otherwise, the requested package is downloaded from the URL (code lines [14] [15] [16] . If the requested URL cannot be accessed for a predefined period of time, the request will be inserted back into the request pool (code lines 20-21). Note that this procedure is a simplified version of the actual procedure. For example, line 22 is used to remove the processed entry, but the actual execution of this command needs to avoid "concurrency modification" exception. Line 23 puts this thread to sleep for a time period of T, which is typically a few seconds. This step minimizes the CPU occupation in order to reduce the influence on other applications running on a volunteer computer; in practice, the response of Freeweb is not sensitive to this sleep interval. 
Communication Management
The Communication Management module manages TCP communication to allow nodes to build TCP connections with other nodes. To make the application more stable, we allocate multiple TCP connections to each running communication management module.
Algorithm 2 shows how a communication manager handles a TCP connection. Currently, there are two different tasks performed by a TCP connection in Freeweb. One is the dissemination of public keys (code lines 2-3) and the other is file transmission on the reply forwarding path (code lines 4-15). In file transmission, after a node receives an instance of archive, it first stores the received package into its local download cache (code line 5). The node then separates the onion from it and peels (i.e., decrypts) the onion (code lines 6-7). If the decrypted result is a predetermined token, this node is the webpage requester and the received webpage is displayed (code lines [8] [9] . If the decrypted result cannot be recognized, then this node must be a relay node on the reply forwarding path. It uses the delimiter, which is a 10 byte string in Freeweb, to divide the decrypted result into three parts: the IP address, the port information, and the peeled onion (code lines 11-13). Finally, this node sends the newly generated archive via TCP using the obtained IP and port number (code lines [14] [15] 
Cache Management
Freeweb employs cache management in order to reduce cost and speed up browsing speed. Freeweb builds a folder cache/recv in each node for webpage caching. Each node also maintains a map file that contains the information of every stored cached webpage file, including the file's DHT key, file name, creation time, and URL. A webpage file's DHT key, denoted pkgID, is a 128-bit unique key which is the consistent hash value of the file's name (e.g., 90368311-b1d6-49c1-91c5-6a8ad5ad0f91). The unique file key helps to identify a requested webpage in a cache and avoids duplicated file caching operations for the same file. Major APIs for cache management are listed in the following. 1) AddPkgToCache(pkgID,URL). This function adds a webpage to the cache/recv folder. When a server finishes downloading a webpage for a requester or a requester receives a webpage, they put this webpage into their corresponding caching folder. The given URL and pkgID are used to record this package in the map file. 2) UpdateMap(pkgID). When a cached file is created, deleted, or discarded, this function is used to make updates to the map file. 3) GetPkgInCache(URL, Timeliness). This function calculates the time interval between the creation time of a cached file in the map file and the current system time. Only when the time interval is no more than the Timeliness will the cached file be returned.
HTTP Access APIs
HTTP access modules are used by a server to obtain webpages from webpage servers. To protect the client's identity, a server does not download JavaScript files embedded in the HTML files, because a node may expose its identity by executing such files. Freeweb aims to provide normal webpages with all essential elements in the webpages. Thus, a 1) AttemptURL(URL). Upon receiving a request, a server attempts to establish a connection with the requested webpage server for a few seconds, which is much less than the typical TCP timeout. If it is unable to make the connection, the server performs the rehashing and forwarding operations. 2) DownloadHTMLPkg(URL, folderPath, pkgID, retrievalMode). A server uses this function to download the HTML source, image files, and CSS, which are put together into one file.
EFFICIENCY ENHANCEMENT METHODS
According to Section 3.4.1, a request of a URL u is forwarded to different destinations with key h k ðuÞ ðk ¼ 1; 2; . . .Þ continuously until finding a destination in an uncensored area of u. Therefore, the node that serves for URL u is always the node with the smallest k 2 N þ . Then, this node will be overloaded if the content in this URL becomes very popular and receives very frequent visits. For example, Jeremy Lin, who has 300 million basketball fans in China [4] , dominated the social media in February 2012 and gained 40,000 followers in four days [8] . When the peer with key h k ðuÞ serving such a popular URL becomes overloaded by responding the HTTP requests, the requesters then must search key h ðkþ1Þ ðuÞ with another routing process, that increases the file access delay. In this section, we propose four methods to reduce the file access delay and avoid node overloads as listed below. Method (1) depends on the caching technique to respond the requests at routing nodes before they reach their destinations. Methods (2) , (3) and (4) are based on the fact that geographically close (i.e., proximity-close, physically close) nodes tend to be in the same censorship because nodes in the same country are more likely to be in the same censorship and geographically close nodes are likely to be in the same country. 1) Path cache checking. Recall that each node caches its previously accessed contents and each Lookup (key) routing request has Oðlog NÞ lookup time complexity. Then, each routing node can directly return requested contents, if it has cached the contents. In this way, the routing overhead and file access time can be reduced. 2) Direct URL requesting. Since the nodes geographically close to the original server of URL u are usually in the same censorship as the server, these nearby nodes should not be censored on URL u. Therefore, a requester for URL u can directly request these nearby nodes to access the requested contents. In this way, the number of routings can be reduced because the destination has a high probability to access the contents. 3) Proximity-aware cached URL requesting. Recall that a requester caches the contents it has requested previously. If node a cannot access URL u, its nearby node b is likely not to be able to access URL u too. Therefore, node a caches URL u after it requests URL u. Then, if node b requests URL u later on, it can fetch the contents directly from node a. Thus, a node can probe its geographically close nodes for its requested contents first before it starts searching key h k ðuÞ. The proximity-aware content fetching without routing greatly reduces the fetch time. 4) Proximity-aware request redirection. When the owner node of h k ðuÞ can access the requested contents but is overloaded, it can redirect the request to its nearby node, which has a high probability to be able to access URL u. Request redirection between geographically close nodes does not generate a long delay. Thus, the overloads can be avoided without greatly affecting the fetch time.
In the enhanced Freeweb, the requester first searches the contents cached by neighbors based on proximity-aware cached URL requesting method. If the search fails in finding the requested URL u, the requester starts searching the node closest to the URL server based on direct URL requesting method, and the routing node may respond the request based on path cache checking method before the request reaches its destination. If this search is also failed, the requester starts searching h k ðuÞ as introduced in Section 3.4.1. In both direct URL requesting method and request forwarding method in Section 3.4.1, the destination server can release its load based on proximity-aware request redirection method. In the following, we first introduce a proximity-aware structure, and then present each of the above four methods.
Proximity-Aware Structure
To let nodes find the proximity-close neighbors, we first introduce Hilbert indices that represent node geographical closeness [48] . To calculate Hilbert number, each peer n i measures its physical distances to pre-determined m landmarks, which are located all over the world, and produces a distance vector as < d 1 ; d 2 ; . . . ; d m > . Then, the peer uses the space-filling curve [13] to transform this vector to a onedimensional Hilbert number, denoted as H n i . The difference of two nodes' Hilbert numbers as jH n i À H n j j indicates their physical closeness. That is, two nodes with closer Hilbert numbers are physically closer to each other, and vice versa.
When a peer, n i , joins in the system, it needs to be assigned a node ID. Instead of using the hash value of its IP address, n i directly uses its Hilbert number H n i as its node ID. If another peer already holds the same ID, node n i is assigned the first available closest ID to H n i . Since Hilbert numbers indicate the physical closeness between peers, the node IDs indicate the physical closeness between peers. In addition to a routing table, n i also creates a neighbor table that records its physically close nodes that have node IDs closest to H n i : H n i þ 1, H n i þ 2, . . ., H n i þg, H n i À 1, H n i À 2, . . ., H n i Àg, where g determines the number of neighbors. A larger g leads to more neighbors of a node and a higher probability that a request can be resolved locally and vice versa. We depend on the stabilization procedure in a DHT P2P system to update the neighbor list of each peer. In the stabilization procedure, each node probes all of its neighbors in the routing table. If a neighbor does not respond in time, the node updates it. As a result, a node can find its proximity-close nodes from its neighbor table.
Path Cache Checking
In the previous file accessing algorithm presented in Section 3.4.1, the destination of key h k ðuÞ ðk ¼ 1; 2 . . .Þ checks whether it can access the file until such a destination is found using DHT routing. Since each node caches its previously accessed contents, we can improve the efficiency of file accesses through the LookupðÞ procedure by letting each routing hop first check its cached contents. If a hop has cached requested contents, it stops DHT routing and directly starts the reply forwarding procedure described in Section 3.4.2. Otherwise, it continues the DHT routing. In this way, the process to find a destination node that can access the requested contents does not need to continue, and also the file access from the identified destination and the web server is avoided. As a result, the routing overhead and file access time is reduced. The efficiency of the path cache checking method depends on the probability that a hop has cached the requested contents. Thus, a higher popularity file has a higher probability to be cached in a routing hop. Since accessing higher popularity files generates lower access time and higher popularity files receive more requests, this path cache checking method greatly reduces the average content access time in the system.
Direct URL Requesting
In the request forwarding as described in Section 3.4.1, the generated target key h k ðuÞ cannot guarantee that the destination peer can access URL u. Thus, this process generates high latency and network load in finding a peer in the uncensored area of URL u by many Lookup(key) routing operations. With the proximity-aware structure, we can easily find a peer in the uncensored area through a single routing operation, which generates low latency and network load. Instead of forwarding a request using hðuÞ as the search key, Freeweb forwards a request to the destination which is close to the server serving URL u and has a high probability to be in the uncensored area.
In our method, when a peer under a censored area wants to access URL u, if this site is not blocked by the DNS filtering and redirection, it first finds the IP address of the server for URL u using the DNS service, and then uses the IP locator service [5] to find the geographical location of the server. Otherwise, it randomly chooses a geographical location in the countries preselected by Freeweb, which are uncensored to most websites, such as the US and UK. Next, it calculates the Hilbert number of this location, denoted as H u . Then, instead of forwarding the request to hðuÞ, the requester forwards the request to the destination with key H u . Based on the proximity-aware structure, a node with the closest ID to H u will receive this request.
If the destination node has cached the requested contents, it replies the contents to the requester; otherwise, it accesses the contents from the web server and responds to the requester. The content reply uses the same reply forwarding method proposed in Section 3.4.2. It is possible that the destination is in a neighbor country and under censored area. Then, the request receiver will forward the request to the destination with key hðH u Þ. The forwarding follows the iteration procedure as in Section 3.4.1 until finding a node that can access the requested contents.
Proximity-Aware Cached URL Requesting
As specified in Section 3.5.3, each requester caches the contents of URLs it has requested before. Thus, in order to reduce service latency, transmission load and be ISPfriendly [18] , a peer can first try to request its requested URL u from its proximity-close neighbors. To do this, a peer probes all its neighbors in its neighbor table with time-tolive (TTL f ), which is the maximum number of probing hops for a request. The TTL f of all neighbors except those with IDs H n i þ g or H n i À g is set to 0 because their subsequent neighbors will receive the request. If the neighbor has not cached the requested contents, it decrements the TTL f by 1 and forwards it to its predecessors (or successors), if the neighbor has a node ID smaller (or larger) than the requester. This procedure repeats, i.e., the request is continually forwarded in the two directions, until a node that has cached the requested contents is reached or TTL f ¼ 0. If TTL f ¼ 0, the requester starts searching the node closest to the URL server as introduced in Section 4.2. If this search is also failed, the requester starts searching h k ðuÞ as introduced in Section 3.4.1.
The TTL indicates the maximum number of hops that a request can be forwarded. If it is set to 1 or a certain constant value, the nodes at the first hop in the forwarding path can know that their predecessor is the requesters, which exposes the identity of the requester. To avoid such identity exposure, each requester sets TTL to a randomly selected value larger than 1 within a certain value range, denoted by TTL f . During the request forwarding along the successors and predecessors, a forwarder node can only know its predecessor and successor in the forwarding path. Since the forwarder node cannot know how many hops the request has been forwarded without knowing TTL f of the requester, it cannot know whether it is at the first hop in the forwarding path. Thus, the identity of requester is protected from the nodes at the first hop.
Upon receiving the request, node n i checks whether it has cached the contents of URL u. If yes, it responds this request; otherwise, it forwards the request to the next hop if TTL > 0. The responder also needs protection since its response indicates that it has previously requested URL u before. If n i directly replies, the first hop in the reply path can know the responder's identity. Thus, as the request forwarding step, the responder sends the reply to a randomly selected node from its neighbor table other than its predecessor in the forwarding path with TTL r , which is a randomly selected value greater than 1 from a value range. The last hop in the reply forwarding with TTL r ¼ 0 starts the onion routing defined by the requester as in Section 3.4.1. Hence, the requester needs to create an onion routing path and sends it along with the request, and the responder also needs to send its response with this onion routing path. As a result, the nodes along the reply forwarding path cannot identify the responder.
Since the forwarding nodes in the request forwarding and reply forwarding paths are physically close to each other, it generates a small network load. Since the requester, responder and forwarding nodes can only know their predecessor and successor in the path, and they do not know the forwarding path length, the identity of both requester and responder are protected.
Proximity-Aware Request Redirection
In the system, since the URL requests under censorship may not be evenly distributed, the load on the peers in the uncensored area may not be evenly distributed. Also, the capacities of peers are heterogeneous. Additionally, the popularity of different URLs may vary over time, which causes the load on peers that serve requests varying over time. Thus, the requests from peers in censored areas may make some peers overloaded while make others underloaded in the uncensored areas. Accordingly, we propose the proximity-aware request redirection method to release the excess load of the overloaded peers to under-loaded peers by redirecting requests.
In this method, each peer n i self-configures the upper bound of resource usage as its server capacity, denoted by C n i , and measures the accumulate workload in a unit of time period T , denoted by L n i , including both file responses and file reply forwarding. Node n i 's available capacity is defined as A n i ¼ C n i À L n i . Whenever peer n i is overloaded, i.e., C n i À L n i < 0, it contacts its neighbors for available service capacity. A node's extra requests is calculated by L n i À C n i . It redirects the extra requests to its neighbors until their available capacities are used up. The number of requests redirected to nodes is proportional to their available service capacities.
For example, peer n i 's neighbors n j and n k have available capacities equal to A n j and A n k , respectively. Then, when redirecting extra requests, n i redirects A n j =ðA n j þ A n k Þ of all extra requests to node n j . In this way, the load is more evenly distributed among the nodes in the uncensored areas. In order to ensure that the selected neighbors can access the request URL u, if the selected neighbor is under a censorship of u, the neighbor will deny the redirection. Then, node n i needs to redirect the request again by selecting another neighbor.
PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
We chose PlanetLab [9] as the experiment testbed in order to evaluate the effectiveness of Freeweb on censorship circumvention in a real worldwide network environment. However, since each slice on PlanetLab is given very limited resources, the network transmission speed and encryption time is much longer than normal. Therefore, the performance presented in this paper reflects the performance of Freeweb in a harsh environment, and its performance in the practical network environment would be much better. We randomly selected 200 PlanetLab nodes located in North America, Asia, Europe, each of which simulates 20 nodes in Freeweb. The default test parameters are shown in Table 1 . Two content retrieval modes are used in the test: full-page and text-only. Full-page mode means that in addition to HTML files, image files of different formats (e.g., GIF, PNG, JPG) and CSS files are also browsed. The length of the onion reply forwarding path (i.e., tunnel) is set to a maximum of 5 [42] . In the experiments, the default setting for the retrieval mode is text-only, the network size is 4,000 nodes, the proportion of the number of clients and servers is 3:1 (denoted by client/server), and the length of an anonymous tunnel is 2, unless otherwise specified.
The tested websites are retrieved from the 100 top sites in Alexa [1] . When a node joins in Freeweb, it is assigned the role of either "client (censored node)" or "server (uncensored node)". Upon receiving the "join" notification, a node randomly chooses a value t from ½0; 60 and joins in the system after t seconds. A client sends out one URL request every 100 seconds. Nodes in PlanetLab are not constantly connected, which provides a simulation environment with ungraceful node departure and failures. We tested the connectivity failure rate of the selected PlanetLab nodes by letting each node try to connect to all other nodes in the system. The connection failure rate of a node is between 4-12 percent, with an average of 6 percent. Thus, Freeweb is tested in an environment with node dynamism.
Malicious servers in our experiment modify the content of a webpage before sending it back to the client. In the experiment, we did not encrypt requests using a public key because the cost of encryption on PlanetLab nodes would dominate the URL requesting process time. We conducted a test on modern computers, and the results show that their public key encryption time is usually 1/10 of that on PlanetLab nodes. PlanetLab nodes are heavily loaded most of the time, so their computing ability is limited. Thus, we believe Freeweb can perform much better on personal computers. Below, Section 5.1 presents the performance of Freeweb without the enhancement methods. Then, Section 5.2 presents the performance of Freeweb with each single enhancement method and all enhancement methods, repsectively.
Effectiveness and Efficiency of Freeweb
The following metrics are used to evaluate Freeweb's performance:
Success rate. This is defined as the ratio of the number of successfully received webpages during a time bound to the number of total requested webpages. This metric shows the effectiveness of Freeweb in censorship circumvention. Fetch time. This is defined as the time interval from the moment a client sends out a request to the moment it receives its requested webpage. This metric shows the efficiency and scalability of Freeweb. The number of hashed destinations. Recall that a request needs to be hashed several times before it reaches a server. This metric is the number of times a request is hashed and sent to the corresponding destination in the DHT network. It shows the transmission cost of Freeweb. Transmission size. This is measured by the size of the uncompressed or compressed package. The former reflects the TCP transmission cost, and the latter reflects the transmission cost. This metric shows the transmission cost of Freeweb. Network load. As in [54] , we measured the network load by S Ã D KB*km (Kilo-Byte-kilometers), where S denotes the size of network packages for a communication and D denotes the distance between the two communication nodes. This metric reflects the effectiveness of the proximity-aware operations in reducing the network load. Fig. 6 shows the success rate of Freeweb versus different tunnel lengths. The time bound was set to 18 and 24 s, respectively. When the time bound is 24 s and the tunnel is shorter than 5 hops, Freeweb can successfully handle 90 percent of requests for both text-only and full-page modes. When the tunnel length is 5, both success rates drop to around 80 percent. This is because more hops in a tunnel result in a higher possibility of failed TCP communication between two endpoints.
We find that the success rates with a 18 s time bound are lower than those with a time bound of 24 s. This is because Freeweb completes fewer requests in a shorter time bound. In this case, full-page mode generates a lower success rate than text-only mode because its webpage contains images in addition to the HTML file, which takes a longer time to process and transmit. The success rate also decreases as the length of the tunnel increases. The results show that Freeweb can achieve relatively high success rates on heavily loaded nodes in PlanetLab and that it is important to choose an appropriate tunnel length to achieve an optimized tradeoff between browsing timeliness and anonymity protection degree. Fig. 7 shows the success rate versus the network size (the total number of nodes) in Freeweb. We can see that the success rate remains at [95, 100 percent] and [60, 70 percent] when the time bound is 24 and 18 s, respectively. The success rate decreases slightly as the network size increases. Thus, the network size does not have a significant impact on the success rate. These results verify that Freeweb has a high scalability that is inherited from the DHT network. This figure confirms our analytical result in Fig. 23 that the success rate increase as the network size decreases. We varied the client/server rate to test its impact on the success rate. Fig. 8 shows the success rate versus the client/ server rate. We can observe that the success rate still remains above 95 percent under the 24 s time bound and above 60 percent under the 18 s time bound. We can also see that as the client/server rate increases, the success rate of the 18 s bound exhibits a slight drop. A higher client/server rates mean that the number of servers decreases and the number of clients increases. Consequently, a request has a lower probability of reaching a server and needs more rehashing and forwarding operations to meet a server. This leads to longer transmission latency, which makes some requests unable to complete within 18 s. It is intriguing to see that the increase of the client/server rate does not significantly affect the success rate of the 24 s time bound. This is because most requests can still be completed within the time bound. The results imply that a request can always reach a server, even when the server/client ratio is as low as 1 6 , and verify the high success rate and censorship-resistant ability of Freeweb. The results confirm our analytical result in Fig. 23 that the success rate increase as the fraction of uncensored nodes increase (i.e., client/server decreases). Fig. 9 shows the performance of Freeweb when there are malicious nodes sending back tampered webpages. If the percentage of malicious servers is p, then the expected success rate is 1 À p. Recall that in order to tackle tampering, a client in Freeweb sends three requests with different destinations and compares its received webpages to identify the correct one. The figure demonstrates that when only 5-10 percent of nodes are malicious, the success rate is nearly 100 percent. When 20 percent of nodes are malicious, the success rate is approximately 90 percent, which is higher than the predicted value of 1 À 20% ¼ 80%, as is the cases where there are 30 and 40 percent malicious servers. The results demonstrate that Freeweb's redundant request strategy is effective in increasing the success rate. There are two main reasons why Freeweb sometimes cannot identify the correct webpage. First, sometimes only one or two webpages are returned. In the test, the first webpage is chosen in this case. Second, as the number of malicious nodes increases, two or three webpages among the three may be from malicious servers. Fig. 10 demonstrates the fetch time with different tunnel lengths. We can see that the fetch time increases almost linearly as the tunnel length increases. The length of a tunnel determines the number of hop-to-hop transmissions of a returned webpage package. We also see that the onion encryption time increases linearly as the length of tunnel increases. Onion encryption operation only encrypts a number of IP and port addresses, but takes 6.6-14.3 seconds, which is a large proportion of the entire fetch time. On modern computers as we tested, this encryption operation usually takes 1/5 of the shown time. Therefore, the encryption can be performed faster in normal computers than in PlanetLab nodes. In addition, we notice the web access time of HTML is only slightly less than that of rich content mode, which shows that the web access time contributes little to the overall fetch time. Fig. 11 plots the 90th percentile, median and the 10th percentile of fetch time under different network scales. It can be observed the fetch time increases slightly as network scale increases. Recall that the average path length of DHTs is log n. Thus, fetch time grows as the length increases in the client-server path. In addition, we can see the 10th percentiles of fetch time are all below 3.6 seconds and do not differ much in different network scales. The 90th percentile of fetch time generally increases as the network scale increase, because larger network scale leads to more nodes to traverse before a server node can be found. The result shows the high scalability of Freeweb due to its underlying DHT network. Fig. 12 demonstrates that the 90th percentile and the median of the number of hashed destinations increase as the network size increases. Given the same percentage of servers, it is easier to find a server in a smaller-scale network than in a larger-scale network. More nodes in the network increase the probability that a request reaches a non-server node. The 10th percentile remains at 1, which implies some requests can always reach servers after the first hashing. Also, we see that the median number stays between 7-14. This means most requests need to be rehashed and forwarded to a new destination a number of times before reaching a server. Fig. 13 shows the 90th percentile, median, and 10th percentile of fetch time with different client/server rates. We see that the fetch time grows as the rate increases. This is because with fewer servers, the request needs more time to find a server. We also observe that the increase in fetch time slows down as the client/server rate increases due to the slowdown of the server decrease rate. Another observation is that the 10th percentile of fetch time is not affected greatly by the client/server rate because a few requests can always reach the server quickly. The 90th percentile of fetch time increases marginally as the client/server rate increases because a request needs to traverse more hops when there are fewer servers. Fig. 14 shows the 90th percentile, median, and 10th percentile of the number of hashed destinations versus the client/server rate. We see that the median grows slightly as the client/server rate increases. It is because fewer servers mean less opportunity for a request to reach a server. The 90th percentiles are almost the same, because there are always a certain number of nodes that need to be rehashed and transmitted many times. The 10th percentile costs only 1 hop due to the same reason to Fig. 12 .
We selected six websites with different download package sizes and measured their transmission sizes with and without compression. The results are illustrated in Fig. 15 . It shows that compression can reduce the transmission size by up to 2/3 in both text-only and full-page modes. This shows the effectiveness of package compression in Freeweb in reducing the traffic compared to the TCP packet transmission in previous censorship circumvention. Further, we can observe that the text-only mode usually incurs only 1/5 to 1/3 of the transmission size of the full-page mode; hence, text-only browsing needs much less time and cost to transmit, which is consistent with the result in Fig. 10 .
Effectiveness of the Enhancement Methods
In this experiment, we implemented and evaluated the enhancement methods introduced in Section 4 based on the implementation of Freeweb in Section 5.1. The request arrival rate of each node was set to 10 requests per minute, following a Poisson distribution [26] , with randomly selected target URL. All the other settings are the same as in Section 5.1. Additionally, since the network size is relative small, by default, there were four neighbors for each node. We varied the number of neighbors from 1 to 4 to evaluated performance differences. The timeout of a cached web page was set to 60 seconds with a storage capacity as 100 MB. We used least recently used cache algorithm to discard web pages when the storage is full. We assumed a bounded Pareto distribution for the bandwidth capacity of nodes [43] with shape 2, lower bound 2 MB=Minute and upper bound 10 MB=Minute. The additional latency for requests handled by an overloaded proxy comparing to an underloaded proxy also follows a bounded Pareto distribution with the shape as 2, the lower bound as 2 second and the upper bound as 10 s. The TTL f for the proximity-aware cached URL requesting in Section 4.4 for each node was customized to 2 for simplicity, and TTL r was randomly chosen from ½1; 2. The tunnel length in the reply forwarding was set to 1, since all methods rely on the procedure of reply forwarding, which makes it not effective in comparing all method. We regard all nodes in Asia as clients, which take up one quarter of all nodes. The timeout of any URL request was set to 30 s. Each experiment lasted 100 minutes.
Effectiveness of Each Enhancement Method
We evaluated the effectiveness of each enhancement method in Section 4. We use Freeweb-to denote Freeweb without any enhancement methods. To evaluate the effectiveness of each individual enhancement method, we tested the performance of Freeweb-with each enhancement method, respectively. PathCache denotes Freeweb with the Path cache checking method in Section 4.2, Direct denotes Freeweb with the direct URL requesting method in Section 4.3, Neighbor denotes Freeweb with the proximityaware cached URL requesting method in Section 4.4, and Redirection denotes the proximity-aware request redirection method in Section 4.5. We use Freeweb+ to denote Freeweb with all enhancement methods in Section 4. In Freeweb+, a file requester probes its neighbors for requested contents first (i.e., uses the proximity-aware cached URL requesting method), and then uses the direct URL requesting method, and finally uses the hðuÞ to find proxies that can access the file, in which the path cache checking method is used. We also tested Freeweb-with random walk [7] (denoted by Random ) that searches nodes in the uncensored areas using the random walk method instead of the request forwarding algorithm in Section 3.4.1. The random walk randomly selects a node, due to the small network scale, from all neighbors to be the next hops until reaching a node in the uncensored areas. Fig. 16 shows the average fetch time of each file request in each method versus the network size increasing from 1,000 to 4,000 with a step size of 1,000. The figure shows that the fetch time follows Freeweb-> Redirection > Direct > PathCache % Random > Neighbor > Free-web+ . Without using any enhancement method, Freeweb-generates the longest file fetch time. Since the workload in our system is not heavy, Redirection slightly reduces the file fetch time of Freeweb by releasing the load on overloaded nodes. Direct directly finds the nearest node to the web server as the proxy to access the contents. Since this nearest node has a high probability to be in an uncensored area of the web server, there is no need to find another proxy, which saves routing latency. Moreover, this proxy is the closest node to the web server, thus reducing web access time. Thus, Direct reduces more fetch time than Redirection . PathCache tries to resolve the request during the routing by looking up the cached contents in each routing hop. Thus, it reduces routing latency as Direct . PathCache avoids the proxy-server web access time when a routing hop has cached the requested contents, while Direct always generates proxyserver web access time. Therefore, PathCache generates shorter latency than Direct . In Random , a request can easily reach a peer in an uncensored area within a few hops since there are many more servers than clients in this scenario. Thus, Random generates shorter routing latency than Direct and PathCache . However, compared to PathCache , Random generates longer web access time, because the randomly reached node in an uncensored area is unlikely to have the cached contents for the request due to the large number of servers and timeout of the cached contents. Therefore, Random and PathCache generate similar fetch time. As requesters in Neighbor directly probe physically close neighbors for requested contents without routing, Neighbor generates shorter latency than PathCache and Random . Freeweb+ integrates all enhancement methods, leading to the shortest fetch time. From the figure, we can also see that the fetch time of all methods except Freeweb+ increases as the network size increases. This is because a larger network size leads to a longer routing latency or a longer communication latency. Since most of the requests are resolved by the cache without or during the routing in Freeweb+ , the fetch time in Freeweb+ is not greatly affected by the network size. This figure indicates that each individual enhancement method is effective in saving fetch time. The combination of all these methods is more effective in reducing fetch time, and makes Freeweb scalable. Fig. 17 shows the average network load of each file request in each method versus the network size increasing from 1,000 to 4,000 with a step size of 1,000. Since the request package is small, we only measured the network load caused by file responses in the server-proxy communication and along the reply forwarding paths. The figure shows that the network load follows Random % Freeweb-% Redirection > PathCache > Direct > Neibhbor > Freeweb+ . Direct , Neighbor and Freeweb+ consider proximity in file search, thus producing lower network load than other methods. The result of Direct > Neighbor > Freeweb+ is caused by the same reasons as in Fig. 16 . In Direct , all requests are solved with a small network load due to short physical distance between the proxy and the web server. Thus, it generates a lower network load than PathCache which stops routing only when a cache is hit. PathCache stops routing once a routing node finds the requested contents in its cache. Thus, PathCache generates a smaller network load than Freeweb-and Redirection , in which a request is always responded by its destination. Since Redirection depends on the same replying procedure as Freeweb-, it generates a similar network load as Freeweb-. This figure indicates that each enhancement method is effective in reducing network load, and the combination of all methods together is the most effective in reducing network load.
Effectiveness of the Proximity Measurement
We next verify the effectiveness of the proximity representation by the Hilbert numbers. We used Freeweb-Hilbert to denote Freeweb+ when the node locality is represented by Hilbert numbers, use Freeweb-Country to denote Freeweb+ when node locality is represented by country code, and use Freeweb-Random to denote Freeweb+ when the neighbors in the neighbor table are selected randomly from all system nodes.
Figs. 18 and 19 show the average web access time (full page) per request and network load of all requests from the identified destinations/proxies to the web servers when the network size increases from 1,000 to 4,000 with a step size of 1,000, respectively. We see that the average proxy-server web access time follows Freeweb-Hilbert < Freeweb-Country < Freeweb-Random . Recall that in Freeweb+, a file requester probes its neighbors for requested contents first (i.e., uses the proximity-aware cached URL requesting method), and then uses the direct URL requesting method, and finally uses the hðuÞ to find proxies that can access the file. Accuracy of finding proximity-close nodes is important in these methods. Even in request routing, the proximityaware structure helps a request to be routed between physically close nodes since node ID represents its proximity. Without considering proximity in these three methods, Freeweb-Random produces the highest access time. Freeweb-Country has a coarse measurement of node proximity since it can only identify nodes in the same country but cannot further measure their physical closeness. As a result, Freeweb-Country produces a longer fetch time than Freeweb-Hilbert . The figure also shows that the web access latency of Freeweb-Hilbert decreases as the number of nodes increases. With more nodes, the expected lowest distance from a proxy to a web server is decreased, which introduces shorter communication latency. Fig. 19 shows the network load of all methods follows the same tendency as Fig. 18 due to the same reasons. Both Figs. 18 and 19 indicate that Freeweb-Hilbert introduces the smallest proxy-server web access latency and network load in all methods. Fig. 20 shows the average neighbor table creation time per node when the number of neighbors of each node increases from 1 to 4 with step size of 1. The neighbor table creation time is the time for a node to find all neighbors and build the neighbor list after it joins in the system. It shows that this average time follows Freeweb-Hilbert < FreewebCountry < Freeweb-Random . Freeweb-Random has the highest latency, because it depends on the DHT routing to find each neighbor with multiple hops. A node in both Freeweb-Hilbert and Freeweb-Country only asks its predecessor and successor to find all neighbors. Freeweb-Hilbert has a lower latency than Freeweb-Country . This is because in Freeweb-Country , the predecessor and successor of a node are randomly selected within a country, thus the communication latency is longer than that in Freeweb-Hilbert , where the proximityaware clustering guarantees the predecessor and successor are the closest nodes to the node. Fig. 20 also shows that the average neighbor table creation time of Freeweb-Random increases as the number of neighbors of a node increases, while the results of other two methods keep stable. This is because Freeweb-Random needs a DHT routing process to find each neighbor, while in other two methods, each node probes its predecessor and successor for all neighbors. This figure indicates that Freeweb-Hilbert has the smallest latency for nodes to find neighbors, which indicates its effectiveness in finding proximity-close nodes and low overhead in neighbor table creation. Fig. 21 shows the average request redirection time upon a node overload versus the number of neighbors of each node. It shows that the average request redirect time follows Freeweb-Hilbert < Freeweb-Country < Freeweb-Random. Freeweb-Hilbert has the shortest latency due to the reason that the target request servers to redirect the requests are physically closest to the overloaded nodes for serving and forwarding files. In Freeweb-Country , the target request servers to redirect the requests are in the same country as the overloaded nodes, that introduces a longer latency than the closest nodes, but shorter latency than randomly selected nodes worldwide. It also shows that the average request redirection time of Freeweb-Hilbert increases as the number of neighbors of each node increases. This is because the expected average distance of a node to its neighbors increases when the number of neighbors of each node increases. The figure indicates that Freeweb-Hilbert introduces a short delay than other methods to avoid overloads. Fig. 22 shows the 90th percentile, the median and the 10th percentile of the node 95th utilization of Freeweb-Hilbert versus the number of neighbors of each node. The node utilization of n i is measure by L n i =C n i . We see that when nodes do not have proximity-close neighbors, the produced median utilization and variation between the 90th percentile and 10th percentile are the highest, which indicates the effectiveness of this scheme in avoiding node overloads. The figure also shows that the median rates and the variation exhibit a decreasing trend as the number of neighbors per nodes increases. This is because more neighbors lead to more node options for an overloaded node to successfully release its excess load. Fig. 22 verifies the effectiveness of the request redirection enhancement method, and indicates that probing a larger number of neighbors achieves a better load balance in reducing node load.
Effectiveness of Different Neighbor Sizes
Summary. In summary, Freeweb achieves high success rates, efficient content fetching, low system overhead and load balanced state among servers.
CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we propose Freeweb, which is built on a P2P network to provide a blocking resistant and tracing resistant collaborative censorship circumvention service. It enables all nodes in the system to collaborate with their web accesses in order to circumvent censorship. A node in a censored area can retrieve its requested webpage with the aid of a node in an uncensored area. Freeweb protects node identify from censors and constructs an anonymous tunnel for web content transmission. It also employs the techniques of encryption, onion routing, and caching to enhance its censorship circumvention ability and reduce browsing cost and latency. To reduce the file access delay and network load and avoid node overload in Freeweb, we further introduce four methods to enhance Freeweb: i) path cache checking, ii) direct URL requesting, iii) proximity-aware cached URL requesting, and iv) proximity-aware request redirection. Extensive experiments on PlanetLab show Freeweb achieves low cost and latency, resistance to malicious nodes, and high success rates for website browsing. Also, the enhancement methods are effective in further reducing file fetch time, network load, and avoiding the node overload of Freeweb. Admittedly, Freeweb is not completely bulletproof. In our future work, we will consider other attacks, such as DoS, and develop anti-attack mechanisms for Freeweb. We will also explore methods to enable Freeweb to retrieve web contents delivered with UDP such as inserting the UDP package as a payload of the replying package and building Freeweb based on the Reliable User Datagram Protocol (RUDP) [33] . Lianyu Zhao received the BS and MS degrees in computer science from Jilin University, China, and the MS degree degree from the Electrical and Computer Engineering Department, Clemson University. His research interests include wireless networks, routing protocols, applications, and security issues in P2P networks.
" For more information on this or any other computing topic, please visit our Digital Library at www.computer.org/publications/dlib.
